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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
An extensive argument has been made in favor of permitting the
trial judge to exercise his discretion in deciding whether added con-
troversies should be decided between the defendant-claimants at the
second stage of interpleader.20 One of the most appealing reasons given
in support of this solution is that such a policy would be in the 'spirit'
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a spirit which would ". . . ad-
judicate all phases of litigation involving the same parties .. and avoid
multiplicity of suits .... -21
Whether the solution offered in the aforementioned argument is ever
accepted, the very existence of such an argument by such a highly re-
spected writer should be sufficient to demonstrate that the problem does
not lend itself to solution by any blanket rule. In the absence of
clarity on the point under the Federal Rules, perhaps the best solution
is for the courts to restrict their decisions to the facts before them; and
not attempt in one stroke to eliminate all possibility of claimants ever
combining Rule 13(g) and the Federal Interpleader Act to secure settle-




M a working hypothesis for carrying out the doctrine of "separation
of powers" which is implicit in the Constitution,' the United States
Supreme Court early adopted the "political question" guide.2 That is,
when the issue is one on which final decision rests with the executive
or legislative branches, the Court will not take jurisdiction. The con-
troversy is non-justiciable, for the reason that it is a question for the
"political departments" and not for the judiciary to decide.3 It is
20 Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L.
Rav. 929 (1943).21 H. F. G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 7 F. R. D. 654, 656 (N. D. Ill.
1947). Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states "... . They [the Rules]
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.' Although Rule 82 forbids any construction of the Federal Rules
which would extend the jurisdiction of the district courts, it is by no means certain
that to permit settlement of cross-claims in interpleader actions between claimants
of different states -would be an extension of jurisdiction.
I In the Federal Constitution it is an implicit rather than express doctrine. The
North Carolina Constitution has an express provision: "The legislative, executive,
and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other." N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §8.
2Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796). See Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. Ray. 485 (1924).
'The fact that a case has been labelled non-justiciable as involving a "political
question" does not necessarily mean that a partisan political struggle is intimately
involved in that case. For example, it is extremely doubtful that party politics
was involved in the case which led the court to say that it is up to Congress to
determine the end of a war. See Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d
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apparent that this so-called guide, as stated, does not tell us what ques-
tions are to be decided by the "political departments" rather than by the
Court. This marking off of boundaries has been done by the Court,
itself, by a process of judicial self-limitation, 4 or by orthodox interpreta-
tion of the Constitution,5 according to one's view.
For example, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to recog-
nize as justiciable questions involving foreign affairs,6 or to enforce the
Constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government. 7 Policies
concerning admission and deportation of aliens are not reviewable," nor
are questions on which an executive officer acts within his discretion as
prescribed by law.9
There is another category of cases on which the label "political ques-
tion and non-justiciable" has been stamped by the federal courts, but
not with consistency. These may be called the "political rights" cases;
i.e., involving the right to vote, to have the vote honestly counted, to
form a new political party, or to have equal voting districts.
The right to vote.-At one time it was held that the right of suffrage
was not among the privileges and immunities to which citizens are en-
titled under the Constitution.'" Not until 1883 did the Supreme Court
rule that there is a Constitutional right to vote for members of Congress,
and that Congress has authority to enact laws protecting this right."
290 (D. C. Cir. 1946). Rather, the central idea in such decisions is to make a
proper apportionment of governmental functions, in accordance with the "separation
of powers" doctrine. Of course, the fact that a decision will be made by Con-
gress or the President is a practical guaranty that party politics will be a factor
in some degree.
' See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1923) and
Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Lizitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221
(1925).
See Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. Ray. 296 (1924).
'"These are considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and
certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a court of justice."
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 260 (U. S. 1796). And it is not for the courts to de-
termine the end of a war declared by Congress. Citizens Protective League v.
Clark, 155 F. 2d 290 (D. C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 787 (1946).
Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849). U. S. CoxsT. Art. IV, §4 reads: "The United States
shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government ...
It is for Congress and not the Court to enforce this provision.
8 Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903). However, this doesn't mean
the courts will refuse to intervene where an individual alien is denied certain
constitutional protections. United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832
(D. C. Vt. 1899) (unlawful search and seizure; held, evidence inadmissable in
deportation proceeding).
'Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1947); Ness v.
Fisher, 223 U. S. 683 (1911); Wilson v. State of N. C., 169 U. S. 586 (1897).
"Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall 162 (U. S. 1874).
"Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883). In this case defendants were
convicted in federal district court in Georgia of beating a Negro because he voted
in an election for a member of Congress. Application for writ of habeas corpus
was denied, holding the federal law under which conviction was obtained as valid.
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Then in Wiley v. Sinkler12 it was established that federal courts have
jurisdiction of actions for damages because of abridgement of this right
of suffrage,13 and subsequent cases have affirmed this view.
14
Another possible redress for violation of the individual's right to
vote was the granting of equitable relief by the federal courts. This
form of relief, in connection with the right to vote, was first directly
considered in Giles v. Harris.15 Plaintiff, Negro, sued in equity to
compel the registrars of Montgomery County, Alabama, to enroll him,
as well as other Negroes, upon the voting lists. It seems clear that the
decision denying equitable relief in this case was not based on the
ground that the subject matter was non-justiciable,' 6 but stands for the
principle that the Court should not put itself in the position of attempt-
ing to supervise an election by exercising its equity jurisdiction. 17 The
Giles v. Harris opinion apparently still stands. No Supreme Court
decision has been found in which equitable remedy was permitted to
enforce an individual's right to vote.' 8
Counting the vote.-Not only is there a Constitutional right to cast
a ballot in an election for federal officials; there is also the right to
have one's vote honestly counted.19 And United States v. Classic20 ex-
tended this to apply to primary electi6ns as well as to general elections.
So far, Supreme Court decisions on the protection of the right to an
honest count have been concerned with criminal action against the
12 179 U. S. 58 (1900).
1' The earlier case of Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883) was relied
upon as establishing such jurisdiction.
14 E.g., Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902) (reversing federal court
below which had dismissed suit solely for want of jurisdiction) ; Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536 (1927) (where defendants acted pursuant to Texas statutes in
denying Negroes right to vote); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932) (where
after the Nixon v. Herndon decision the State Democratic Executive Committee
-was given authority, by statute, to prescribe voting qualifications but the Court
held this was still action under state law and recovery allowed) ; Smith v. All-
right, 321 U. S. 649 (1949) (allowing recovery of damages where plaintiff was
denied right to vote in primary election under authority of resolution by the
Democratic Party Convention rather than under a state law). This last named
case overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935) which had denied re-
covery on the ground that plaintiff Negro was refused permission to vote pursuant
to a resolution of the state convention of the Democratic Party and not under
any state law.
15 189 U. S. 475 (1902).
1 ,. . we are not prepared to say that the decree should be affirmed on the
ground that the subject matter is wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit
court." Id. at 486.
1 See discussion of this point in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 272 (1939).
18 The prominent cases concerning the right to vote did not involve equitable
relief. Smith v. Allright, 321 U. S. 649 (1943) (action for damages for refusing
to permit plaintiff to vote in primary election; recovery allowed). United States
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1940) (indictment under federal statute charging election
commissioners altered and falsely counted ballots in primary election upheld).
19 United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 (1915).
'313 U. S. 299 (1940).
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wrong-doer rather than individual actions for damages or for relief in
equity.
21
Voting districts.-Three cases involving mandamus proceeding which
brought into question the validity of state laws setting up Congressional
districts were decided in 1931.22 In Smiley v. Holm,23 Koenig v.
Flynn,24 and Carroll z. Becker,25 the issue was the same.2 6  The de-
fendants in each case vigorously contended that these were non-
justiciable issues, concerning matters which should be left to the
"political departments" to decide. In each case this defense was re-
jected, jurisdiction was taken, and judgment rendered to the effect that
the respective redistricting acts were invalid and that elections be held
at large2 7 until appropriate state legislation provided for districts. So
far as the justiciability of a case involving the validity of state redis-
tricting acts, it would appear that the three cases above conclusively
settled the matter. 28  But not so. The later case of Colegrove v. Green
2 9
muddied the waters of justiciability which, if not crystal clear up to
this point, were at least less murky. Plaintiffs in this case sought a
declaratory judgment to the effect that the Illinois redistricting acts de-
nied them equal protection of the laws. The uncontradicted evidence
"' But see Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W. D. Ark. 1948) (where de-
fendants were charged with illegal possession of poll tax receipts with intent to
obtain a fraudulent count of votes; equitable relief denied).
" Also in an 1892 case, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, plaintiff sued for
writ of mandamus to order the Secretary of the State of Michigan to disregard
a legislative enactment providing for election of presidential electors by districts,
instead of by the state at large. Defense of "political question and non-justiciable"
was rejected, although decision was for the defendants that the Michigan act was
valid under the Constitution.
23 285 U. S. 355 (1931) (arising from Minnesota).
2 285 U. S. 375 (1931) (arising from New York).
.0 285 U. S. 380 (1931) (arising rrom Missouri).
-' In Minnesota, New York, and Missouri, a congressional redistricting act had
been passed by the legislatures of those states, and in each instance had been
vetoed by the governor and the vetoes had not been overridden by a subsequent vote
in the legislature. In each case, a writ of mandamus was sought, either to re-
strain (in Minnesota) or to compel (in Missouri and New York) giving effect
to the legislative action in an election soon to take place.
"? This was the case in Minnesota and Missouri. In the case of New York,
two new representatives were allotted on the basis of increased population. The
Court of Appeals of New York had ruled that election be based upon old districts
(43), with the two new representatives being elected at large, and this was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
.' Apparently two federal district courts considered the matter of justiciability
in such cases had been settled. In Wood v. Broom, 1 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. Miss.
1932), plaintiff sought equitable relief on the ground that newly created congres-
sional districts were not composed of compact and contiguous territory or had
nearly as practicable the same number of inhabitants. The district court thought
the 1929 federal act on reapportionment made such requirements of the states,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff. But this was reversed in 287 U. S. 1 (1932)
on the sole ground that the 1929 act did not make such requirements, and the
Court expressly excluded consideration of justiciability of the controversy. See
also Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky.), rev'd, 287 U. S. 575 (1932),
on same grounds.
- 328 U. S. 549 (1946).
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was that no change in congressional election districts had been made for
forty years, despite great changes in the distribution of population result-
ing in districts which ranged in population from 112,000 to 900,000.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the fed-
eral act3° on reapportionment of congressional districts contained no
requirement that districts be compact and have approximate equality
of population. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal
of the action, three members of the majority3 ' for the reason adopted
by the lower court, and for the additional reason that the matter was
"political" and therefore non-justiciable
32
Apparently three justices deciding the Colegrove case33 distinguish
between an action to recover money damages, and an action seeking
equitable relief (before the damage occurs), although the basis of each
suit is a discriminatory state districting law.3 4  In the first, the action
is considered justiciable and the controversy is decided on the merits;
in the second, the action is deemed non-justiciable and the merits of the
controversy are not considered. Although this view was set out in the
controlling opinion of the Colegrove case, it could not be taken as a
holding of the Court inasmuch as a majority of the members thought
that Smiley v. Holm 5 had determined that such cases were justiciable.3 6
Forming a new political party.-That the Court did not accept the
doctrine of non-justiciability expressed in the Colegrove case seems to
be borne out by the later case of MacDougall v. Green.3 7  The plaintiffs
here were members of the Progressive Party in Illinois and sought an
injunction against enforcement of a state law3" requiring signatures of
3°46 STAT. 21 (1929), as amended, 2 U. S. C. §2a.
31Justice Frankfurter announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an
opinion as to non-justiciability in which Justices Reed and Burton concurred.
Justice Rutledge (casting the deciding vote) concurred in the result solely on
the ground that the Court should of its discretion decline equitable relief in view
of the short time remaining until the Illinois election, expressing the opinion
that the case was justiciable. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy were also of
opinion the case was justiciable, and in addition, dissented from the result.
" This Court has refused to intervene in such controversies ". . . because due
regard for the effective working of our government revealed this issue to be of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946).
"Justices Burton, Frankfurter and Reed.
' "This is not an action to recover for damage because of the discriminatory
exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens. The basis for the
suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity." Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946).
35285 U. S. 355 (1931).
"6 The fact that Smiley v. Holm originated in the state court and the Cole-
grove case in the federal court would not seem to be basis for a distinction on
the point of justiciability of controversy. If the court deciding Smiley v. Holm
had thought it non-justiciable, there was precedent to so declare even though the
case came up on appeal from the highest state court rather than originating in a
lower federal court. See Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912),
37335 U. S. 281 (1948).
"ILL. REV. STAT. c. 46, §10-2 (1947).
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200 qualified voters from each of at least fifty counties, contending that
this gave voters of the less populous counties the power to block com-
pletely nomination of candidates whose support was confined to the
populous areas. The defense of "political question and non-justiciable"
was raised, but without discussing jurisdiction the Court expressly de-
cided the case on its merits against the plaintiffs.3 9 Thus by inference,
MacDougall v. Green holds that such political rights cases are justiciable,
and further, that equity jurisdiction may be exercised.
4°
The most recent political rights case in which equitable relief was
sought was South v. Peters,41 in which the Georgia county-unit system
was attacked as being unconstitutionally discriminatory. 42 In a per
curiam opinion dismissing the appeal the language used seems consistent
with the prior cases of Colegrove v. Green and MacDougall v. Green on
the point of justiciability of the controversy,4 3 but applies a harsher re-
striction on the use of equity jurisdiction:
"Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers
in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical
distribution of electoral strength among its political sub-
divisions."
44
Even so, the opinion may be interpreted as leaving open the possibility
that equity jurisdiction could be exercised for the protection of political
rights other than those involved in the redistricting cases.
45
Although the non-justiciable obstacle posed in Colegrove v. Green
has apparently been definitely rejected by the Court in the later cases,
the view seems to have been adopted in lower federal court decisions. 46
°"It is allowable state policy to require that candidates for state-wide office
should have support not limited to a concentrated locality." MacDougall v.
Green, 335 U. S. 281, 283 (1948).
" See Note, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 659 (1949) for discussion of equity jurisdiction
of federal courts in political rights cases.
"70 Sup. Ct. 641 (1950).
"Cases contesting the Georgia county-unit system have been before the Court
before, but appeals were dismissed. Cook v. Fortson and Turman v. Duckworth,
329 U. S. 675 (1946). Justice Rutledge pointed out that the courts below, Cook
v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N. D. Ga. 1946) and Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F.
Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga. 1946), based decisions for defendants largely on Colegrove
v. Green, and it was his view that the issues of jurisdiction in such cases had not
been conclusively adjudicated by that decision.
"Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion writes as if the decision of the court
turned on the point of justiciability. See South v. Peters, 70 Sup. Ct. 641, 644
(1950). It is unlikely that the majority would so interpret their decision.
"Id., at 642 (italics added).
" For example, the right to register and vote in a primary election. See Rice
v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948). In this
case plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from denying Negro electors right to
vote. Judgment of the district court in favor of plaintiff was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
" See Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W. D. Ark. 1948) ; Turman v. Duck-
worth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga. 1946); Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624
(N. D. Ga. 1946).
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For this reason, a full discussion of the issue by the Supreme Court,
as it relates to political rights cases, will likely be necessary to avoid
further conflicting opinions in the lower courts.
While it is not clearly known whether the attitude of the Court
toward exercising equity jurisdiction in redistricting cases which arose
in the federal courts would be equally hostile to such cases originating
in the state courts, it is quite probable that both avenues to the Supreme
Court were foreclosed by South v. Peters. Even though equity juris-
diction is denied in the redistricting cases, there remains a possible re-
dress in an action for damages.47 In addition, there is the possible use
of the writ of mandamus in the state courts, as in Smiley v. Holm, by
bringing into question the validity of a state law under the Federal Con-
stitution, and thereupon gaining direct appeal to the United States




The development of the comprehensive automobile insurance policy
has been rapid in recent years and the policy has become one of the
major coverages in North Carolina. It is an extensive sort of policy
including loss of or damage to an automobile from such older causes
as fire and theft as well as losses from more novel causes such as
missiles, falling objects, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water,
flood, vandalism, and civil commotion. Generally, the clause provides
that the coverage extends to any loss or damage except by collision or
upset.'
The coverage of the comprehensive clause, however, is subject to a
number of exclusions and exceptions. In North Carolina, the coverage
does not apply (a) while the car is used as a public or livery convey-
ance, (b) while the car is subject to an undeclared encumbrance, (c)
during war or revolution, (d) if the damage to the automobile is caused
by mechanical breakdown unless such breakdown would otherwise be
covered, (e) to wearing apparel or personal effects, (f) to tires unless
they would otherwise be covered, or (g) to loss due to conversion or
embezzlement or secretion by anyone lawfully entrusted with possession
of the car.
2
," This possibility may be inferred from language in Colegrove v. Green, 328
U. S. 549, 552 (1946). See note 34 supra.
1 Often losses falling within what would commonly be covered under an
ordinary collision policy are also included within the comprehensive clause. See
Billings, Present Periphery of Comprehensive Coverage, 306 INs. L. J. 572 (1948).
2 North Carolina Automobile Certificate of Insurance Specimen, December,
1947.
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